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ABSTRACT 
 
Consumer genomics is an industry that is undergoing exponential 
growth.  Although consumers in the United States (U.S.) currently 
purchase the bulk of online direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic tests, the 
DTC industry’s business model depends on exploiting markets worldwide.  
DTC genetic testing companies increasingly seek to market and sell their 
services throughout the European Union (EU), which is one of the world’s 
largest economies and is home to a digital, educated, and wealthy 
consumer base.  Since May 2018, the EU General Data Protection 
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Regulation (GDPR) provides EU consumers with enhanced data privacy 
protections and places stricter controls on genetic data.  When EU 
consumers purchase online DTC genetic tests, they exercise two distinct 
fundamental rights—the right to data privacy and the right to informed 
medical consent.  The article explores the intersection of these rights by 
examining relevant EU and other legislation, mainly the GDPR, the In 
Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices Regulation, and the Council of 
Europe’s Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.  
Additionally, the discussion highlights the challenges associated with 
protecting consumers’ autonomy and freedom to purchase online DTC 
genetic tests, while also safeguarding the bioethical standards of informed 
consent.   
The analysis explains that the online purchase of a DTC genetic test 
involves two distinct consent processes—one for data processing and the 
other for informed consent.  These two consent processes are highly 
dependent upon each other to protect consumers adequately.  Yet, the 
status quo reveals that informed consent is severely lacking in the 
purchase of online DTC genetic tests.  This results in consumers’ loss of 
control over health and medical decisions, as well as over personal data.  
Consequently, as the DTC genetic testing industry continues to grow, 
there is a critical need for more robust online informed consent 
procedures.  The article concludes that current EU regulations fail to 
sufficiently address the issues specific to online DTC genetic tests.  
Furthermore, an EU regulation on informed consent, in general, is not 
feasible.  Thus, the article considers opportunities for the EU and its 
Member States, consumers, and industry to work together to both 
empower and protect consumers who purchase online DTC genetic tests.  
Finally, the article discusses methods for industry to improve the online 




Der Markt für Verbraucherprodukte im Bereich Genomik wächst 
rapide. Während derzeit die überwiegende Mehrheit der online direkt an 
VerbraucherInnen vermarkteten (Direct-to-Consumers, DTC) Gentests in 
den USA gekauft wird, ist der Erfolg des DTC-Geschäftsmodells vom 
Zugang zum weltweiten Markt abhängig.  Unternehmen, welche DTC-
Gentests anbieten, vermarkten und verkaufen ihre Dienste zunehmend 
auch in der Europäischen Union (EU), einer der größten Volkswirtschaften 
der Welt mit einer durchwegs digitalisierten, gebildeten und kaufkräftigen 
Bevölkerung.  Seit Mai 2018 genießen europäische KonsumentInnen 













Datenschutz und einen nun strenger regulierten Umgang mit genetischen 
Informationen.  Erstehen KonsumentInnen in der EU DTC-Gentests 
online, machen sie von zwei verschiedenen Grundrechten Gebrauch: dem 
Recht auf Datenschutz und dem Recht auf Aufklärung vor der 
Einwilligung im Medizinbereich. Basierend auf einer Analyse relevanter 
EU- und anderer Gesetzgebung, darunter insbesondere der DSGVO, der 
In-vitro-Diagnostika-Verordnung und des Oviedo-Übereinkommens über 
Menschenrechte und Biomedizin des Europarats, untersucht die 
vorliegende Arbeit die Schnittstellen dieser beiden Rechte.  Zudem wird 
die Herausforderung thematisiert, die Autonomie und Freiheit von 
KonsumentInnen, online DTC-Gentests zu erwerben, zu schützen und 
gleichzeitig die bioethischen Standards der informierten Einwilligung zu 
wahren.   
Die Analyse zeigt, dass der Online-Erwerb eines DTC-Gentests zwei 
unterschiedliche Einwilligungsprozesse umfasst: einerseits hinsichtlich der 
Datenverarbeitung, andererseits in Bezug auf die informierte Einwilligung.  
Für den ausreichenden Schutz von KonsumentInnen ist eine enge 
Interdependenz dieser beiden Einwilligungsprozesse erforderlich.  Die 
informierte Einwilligung im Rahmen des Online-Kaufes eines DTC-
Gentests ist in der Praxis jedoch hochgradig mangelhaft.  Als Folge 
verlieren KonsumentInnen die Kontrolle über Entscheidungen hinsichtlich 
ihrer Gesundheit und medizinischer Verfahren wie auch in Bezug auf ihre 
persönlichen Daten.  Angesichts des anhaltenden Wachstums des Marktes 
für DTC-Gentests besteht dringender Bedarf an robusten Online-
Verfahren zur Einholung einer informierten Einwilligung.  Die Arbeit 
zieht die Schlussfolgerung, dass die bestehenden EU-Verordnungen in 
Hinblick auf die spezifischen Problemstellungen bei Online-DTC-Gentests 
unzureichend sind.  Gleichzeitig wäre aber eine EU-Verordnung zur 
informierten Einwilligung grundsätzlich nicht umsetzbar.  Die Arbeit 
beleuchtet daher die Chancen der Kollaboration von EU, Mitgliedstaaten, 
KonsumentInnen und Anbietern mit dem Ziel, KonsumentInnen von 
online erworbenen DTC-Gentests zu stärken und zu schützen.  
Abschließend werden für Anbieter intendierte Methoden zur Verbesserung 
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Being European means the right to have your personal data 
protected by strong, European laws.  Because Europeans do not like 
drones overhead recording their every move, or companies 
stockpiling their every mouse click.  This is why Parliament, 
Council and Commission agreed…this year [to] a common 
European data protection regulation.  This is a strong European law 
that applies to companies wherever they are based and whenever 
they are processing your data.  Because in Europe, privacy matters.  
This is a question of human dignity.1  
 
President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker 
 
President Juncker’s speech references the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR).2  In April 2016, the European Union (EU or Union) 
enacted the GDPR with the goal of protecting EU residents with respect to 
the processing of their personal data.3  The regulation went into direct 
effect throughout the EU on May 25, 2018, and is far-reaching, affecting 
anyone who processes the personal data of natural persons located within 
the EU, regardless of their nationality or place of residence.4  It is a 
“strong European law”5 because it applies to U.S. and other foreign 
companies that do business in the EU, notably capturing those businesses 
that conduct operations solely through e-commerce without having a 
brick-and-mortar place of business within the Union. 
In that same State of the EU speech, Commission President Juncker 
underscored that people’s lives and the economy depend on digital 
technology, and he emphasized the need to create a “Europe that 
empowers [its] citizens and [its] economy” in this digital age.6  The GDPR 
is a primary component of the EU Data protection framework and also of 
the EU’s Digital Single Market (DSM) initiative. The DSM works to 
 
 
1   Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union 2016, PUBS. OFF. EUR. UNION 10 (Sept. 14, 2016), 
https://publications.europa.eu/de/publication-detail/-/publication/c9ff4ff6-9a81-11e6-9bca-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en (last visited July 18, 2019) (emphasis added). 
2   Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), Apr. 
27, 2016, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
3   Id. art. 4(1). The GDPR defines “personal data” as “any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’).” Id. 
4   Id. art. 99(2).  
5   Juncker, supra note 1, at 10. 













ensure the free movement of persons, services and capital, and where 
individuals and businesses can “seamlessly access and engage in online 
activities under conditions of fair competition, and a high level of 
consumer and personal data protection, irrespective of their nationality or 
place of residence.”7  The GDPR offers EU residents the opportunity and 
legal mandate to gain greater control over their data, especially over the 
proliferation of personal data that is available online.   
It has been more than a year since the GDPR came into force.  This 
article discusses the GDPR in the context of online Direct-to-Consumer 
(DTC) genetic tests sold to consumers within the EU.  Typically, DTC 
genetic tests, including test results and interpretations, are sold directly to 
the consumer without the involvement of a healthcare provider.8  This 
common definition of DTC genetic tests is used throughout the article.   
The GDPR specifically addresses genetic data, but only within the 
limited context of data processing and the protection of sensitive 
information.  Yet, as the discussion illustrates, the online DTC genetic 
testing industry faces the challenge of protecting consumers on two 
fronts—informed consent and data privacy.  These two issues are 
inextricably linked for consumers purchasing online genetic tests.   
Given the growing trend towards DTC genetic testing and the scientific 
research derived from consumers’ participation, there is an increasing need 
for more robust online informed consent that adequately protects and 
empowers the consumer.   
This analysis begins with the recent EU Regulation on In Vitro 
Diagnostic Medical Devices (IVDR).  The evolution of the IVDR 
demonstrates the EU’s authority and willingness, if any, to impose 
informed consent requirements on genetic testing.  This article discusses 
how, if at all, the IVDR and GDPR empower and protect EU consumers 
who directly purchase the online services of DTC genetic testing 
companies.  Additionally, the analysis focuses on the dual challenge of 
empowering and protecting consumers of DTC genetic tests and makes 





7   Shaping the Digital Single Market Strategy, EUR. COMM., https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/policies/shaping-digital-single-market (last visited July 18, 2019). The Digital Single 
Market (DSM) strategy was adopted on May 6, 2015.  
8   H. Skirton, et al., Direct to consumer genetic testing: a systematic review of position 
statements, policies and recommendations, 82 CLIN. GENET. 1, 1 (2012). 











II. OVERVIEW OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER (DTC) GENETIC TESTING 
COMPANIES AND ONLINES SALES IN THE EU 
In June 2019, Top10.com listed the five following deoxyribonucleic 
acid (DNA) testing companies as the best of 2019: MyHeritage, 
LivingDNA, AncestryDNA, 23andMe and Vitagene.9  PCWorld also 
ranked the best DNA kits by category, citing 23andMe as the best DNA 
kit overall for its comprehensive coverage of ancestry and genetic health 
information.10  AncestryDNA ranked in second place mainly due to it 
having the largest DNA database with tests from more than 10 million 
people and regular updates made to its ethnicity estimates.11  MyHeritage 
ranked as the most affordable testing service, but it has only 1.5 million 
people in its database and a greater percentage of them located in Europe.  
Family Tree DNA, the oldest U.S.-based DNA testing company, ranked as 
the best for privacy protections.  However, the company faced a 
significant privacy scandal in early 2019.  Despite an earlier proclamation 
from Family Tree DNA founder and president Bennett Greenspan stating, 
“We don’t believe [user data] should be sold, traded, or bartered,”12 the 
company acknowledged in February 2019 that it had failed to disclose its 
sharing of genetic information with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to 
help solve violent crimes.13  Still, unlike most of the DTC genetic testing 
companies, such as 23andMe and AncestryDNA, Family Tree DNA does 
not ask consumers to consent to agreements that may result in companies 
and researchers acquiring their data. 
23andMe has been at the center of several debates about the ethics of 
for-profit DTC genetic tests.  For example, between 2007 and 2012, the 
company enticed consumers and research participants by offering genetic 
tests at low prices (e.g., starting at $299 and now lowered to $99) and even 
free saliva collection kits in return for saliva samples.  The company also 
launched the “23andWe” project in 2008, asking consumers to collaborate 
with the company in prioritizing its disease research efforts.  Participants 
voted on a list of diseases, and the company developed numerous surveys 
 
 
9  The Best DNA Testing Kits 2019 - Trace Your Ancestry and Genetic Heritage, TOP10.COM 
(June 10, 2019), https://www.top10.com/dna-testing/top-reads/best-dna-testing-kits. 
10  Dieter Holger, Best DNA testing kits: Discover the secrets stored in your genes, PCWORLD 
(Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.pcworld.com/article/3317567/best-dna-kits.html. 
11  Id. PCWorld also awarded AncestryDNA the best-in-category for adoptees and genealogy. 
Id. 
12  Id. See FamilyTreeDNA, The FamilyTreeDNA Promise, YOUTUBE (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0zGdJuBY0k0&feature=youtu.be (last visited July 18, 2019). 
13  Matthew Haag, FamilyTreeDNA Admits to Sharing Genetic Data With F.B.I., N.Y. Times 













for participants to share their personal health, lifestyle and other 
information with the company.14  In fact, the 23andMeBlog described the 
project’s goal as to “help bring the dream of personalized medicine a few 
steps closer to reality.”15  At the same time, it pleaded, “all we need you to 
do is take some surveys.”16  By 2012, the information derived from the 
23andWe project led to a “patent for a method of determining 
predisposition to Parkinson[’s] disease.”17  Many consumers and research 
participants felt betrayed when they learned that 23andMe had secured a 
patent based on their genetic and personal data.   
As New York University Professor Charles Seife said in 2013, the 
“[p]ersonal genome service . . . is a mechanism meant to be a front end for 
a massive information-gathering operation against an unwitting public.”18  
While there is truth in his statement, the company 23andMe has not hidden 
its agenda.  Patrick Chung, a 23andMe board member, acknowledged, in a 
2013 interview: 
 
The long game here is not to make money selling kits, although the 
kits are essential to get the base level data. . . Once you have the 
data, [23andMe] does actually become the Google of personalized 
health care.19 
 
A recent study predicts that the DTC genetic testing market will exceed 
2.5 billion U.S. dollars by the year 2025.20  The same study assesses the 
main factor to drive industry growth will be the increasing demand for 
“service personalization in developed regions” such as North America and 
Europe.21  As of March 2020, 23andMe’s Europe website ships both 
 
 
14 Joyce, 23andWe: The First Annual Update, 23ANDMEBLOG (Jan. 5, 2009), 
https://blog.23andme.com/23andme-and-you/23andwe-the-first-annual-update/. 
15  Id. 
16  Id. 
17  Megan Allyse, 23 and Me, We and You: direct-to-consumer genetics, intellectual property 
and informed consent, 31 Trends Biotechnol 68, 68-9 (2013). 
18 Charles Seife, 23andMe Is Terrifying, but Not for the Reasons the FDA thinks – The genetic-
testing company’s real goals is to hoard your personal data, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Nov. 27, 2013), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/23andme-is-terrifying-but-not-for-the-reasons-the-fda-
thinks/. 
19  Id. 
20  Sumant Ugalmugle & Rupali Swain, DTC Genetic Testing Market to exceed US $2.5 Bn by 
2025, GLOB. MKT. INSIGHTS (June 18, 2019), https://www.gminsights.com/pressrelease/direct-to-
consumer-dtc-genetic-testing-market (last visited July 18, 2019). 
21  Global Market Insights, Inc., Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Market to hit $2.5Bn by 
2024: Global Market Insights, Inc., PR NEWSWIRE (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/direct-to-consumer-genetic-testing-market-to-hit-2-5-bn-
by-2024-global-market-insights-inc--830436085.html (last visited July 18, 2019). 











ancestry and health tests to only five EU countries—Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland, Sweden, and the Netherlands.  However, the company’s 
international website ships ancestry tests to the remaining twenty-two EU 
countries.  Even though the company currently does not sell health tests to 
all EU countries, citing shipping restrictions “due to the applicable 
regulations,”22 it still asks consumers who order only ancestry tests from 
the international website to participate in research.23  The company 
encourages consumers to participate in research, claiming they are 
“becoming part of something”24 that is bigger than themselves.  The 
genetic and personal data obtained from selling ancestry tests alone is a 
treasure trove of data.  As the 23andMe website explains, once participants 
choose to “[a]nswer online survey questions, researchers link their genetic 
data to study topics from ancestry, to traits, to disease.  These 
contributions help drive scientific discoveries.”25  The growth of European 
customers is evident by MyHeritage opening in 2018 its first European 
distribution center for DNA kits in the Netherlands.26  MyHeritage ships 
its ancestry DNA kits to most countries in Europe, including those in the 
EU, and claims it saw a 450 percent increase in sales in Europe in the first 
five months of 2018.27  Some of the other principal companies providing 
DTC genetic tests to the European market include Dante Labs,28 
24Genetics,29 Athgene,30 Genyuss,31 cerascreen32 and tellmeGen33—all of 
 
 
22  Change Location, 23ANDME, INC., https://www.23andme.com/en-int/?myg=true (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2020). 
23  Becoming Part of Something bigger., 23ANDME, INC., https://www.23andme.com/en-
int/research/ (last visited July 22, 2019). 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  Esther, MyHeritage Opens European Distribution Center for DNA Kits, MYHERITAGE BLOG 
(June 29, 2018), https://blog.myheritage.com/2018/06/myheritage-opens-european-distribution-center-
for-dna-kits/. 
27  Id. 
28  About, DANTE LABS, INC., https://www.dantelabs.com/pages/about (last visited July 18, 
2019). Dante Labs is specialized in whole genome sequencing and offers its tests throughout the EU. 
29  Life is DNA, 24GENETICS, https://24genetics.com/en/team (last visited July 18, 2019). 
24Genetics is based in Europe and claims to be the largest European DTC provider of ancestry and 
wellness DNA tests. 
30  Register, ATHGENE, https://athgene.nordicvms.com/Register.aspx?rtn=c (last visited July 18, 
2019); Discover What Makes You Unique, ATHGENE, http://www.athgene.com/ (last visited July 18, 
2019). Athgene offers fitness, lifestyle, and nutrition DNA tests to consumers throughout the EU. 
31  Home, GENYUSS, https://www.testgeneticoonline.com/en/home/ (last visited July 18, 2019). 
Genysuss offers health, nutrition, sport nutrition, and dermatological tests to consumers throughout the 
EU.  
32  About Us, CERASCREEN, https://www.cerascreen.co.uk/pages/about-us (last visited July 18, 
2019); Zahlung & Versand, CERASCREEN, https://www.cerascreen.de/pages/versand-zahlung (last 
visited July 18, 2019). Cerascreen offers consumers health DNA tests, as well as follow-up products 
and services. The company delivers to fifteen EU countries, plus Norway and Switzerland.  













which can be purchased from the companies’ websites or on some of 
Amazon’s European websites.34  In 2019, Dante Labs established a new, 
highly automated DNA sequencing center in Italy.35  To recognize this 
milestone, on Amazon’s Prime Day in July 2019, Dante Labs offered to 
consumers worldwide whole genome sequencing with a new Artificial 
Intelligence-powered personalized report for 299 Euro—a fraction of the 
normal price.36  
The DTC genetic testing landscape is changing rapidly as genomic 
technology advances and consumer interest increases with a growing 
variety of DNA tests on the market.  In the process of acquiring this big 
data, the DTC genomic industry must be accountable to consumers and 
research participants.  Such accountability requires robust informed 
consent procedures.  As University of Hong Kong Professor Annie 
Cheung underscores, there must be a commitment to the values that 
underpin consent, which are “[a]utonomy, fairness and propriety in the 
name of research.”37  According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy: 
 
Informed consent is currently treated as the core of bioethics.  In 
clinical  practice, the doctrine of informed consent rose to 
dominance during the  course of the 20th century.  It replaced a 
medical ethos founded on trust in  physicians’ decisions, often on 
the assumption that “doctor knows best,”  with an ethos that 
sought to put patients in charge of their own care.38 
 
Our present understanding of the ethical and legal doctrine of informed 
 
 
July 18, 2019). TellmeGen, headquartered in Spain, offers a comprehensive DNA test throughout the 
EU that includes, health, individual traits, and ancestry information. The company also offers various 
post-test medical and nutritional personalized counseling (i.e., with physicians, geneticist, or 
nutritionists) options for a fee.  
34  See www.amazon.de, www.amazon.it, www.amazon.es, www.amazon.co.uk. As of July 18, 
2019, the France and Netherlands’ Amazon sites did not offer DNA test kits. 
35  Dante Labs, Inc., Dante Labs Announces New Special Offering for Prime Day 2019, in 
Celebration of Its New AI-Powered Reports and Sequencing Center, PR Newswire (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/dante-labs-announces-new-special-offering-for-prime-
day-2019-in-celebration-of-its-new-ai-powered-reports-and-sequencing-center-300884751.html. 
36  Dante Labs, Inc., Dante Labs Launches GenomeL, the First Commercial Long Reads Human 
Whole Genome Sequencing, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/dante-labs-launches-genomel-the-first-commercial-long-reads-human-whole-genome-
sequencing-300826213.html. 
37  Annie Cheung, Moving beyond Consent for Citizen Science in Big Data Health and Medical 
Research, 16 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 15, 17 (2018).  
38  Nir Eyal, Informed Consent, in THE STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL (Edward N. Zalta, ed., 
2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/informed-consent/. 











consent, particularly that involving human research, traces its roots to the 
post-World War II period.  The discovery of barbaric human experiments 
carried out by the German and Japanese forces led in part to such 
influential developments as the Nuremberg Code39 and the Declaration of 
Helsinki (DoH),40 which served as early models for governments to 
develop informed consent guidelines, laws and regulations.41  Section VI 
further discusses the impact of the Nuremberg Code and the DoH on the 
development of informed consent principles in Europe.  Sorin Hostiuc 
explains that the legal doctrine of informed consent evolved differently in 
Europe from that in the United States and in Britain.42  This divergence is 
primarily due to key differences between the American and British 
common law tradition (i.e., based on legal precedent) and that of Europe’s 
civil law tradition (i.e., based on Roman law and its moral principles).43  
Hostiuc provides examples from certain European countries, like in France 
and Germany, where informed consent was either rooted in the moral 
behavior of physicians (i.e., in France and Germany primarily in the 19th 
century) or in terms of the relationship between the investigator and his 











39  Library Congr., Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under 
Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. II 181-83 (1949) [hereinafter Nuremberg Code].   
40  World Med. Ass’n, World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles 
for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (2013) [hereinafter DoH]. 
41  Ruth R. Faden & Tom L. Beauchamp, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 
151, 156, 186 (1986) (explaining that following the end of World War II and the conclusion of the 
Nuremberg Trials there was a dramatic shift from there being “virtually no noteworthy formal 
guidelines or codes governing research with human subjects;” to there being more than 20 guidelines 
and codes designed to protect human subjects, which were adopted between 1948 and 1968 by major 
organizations. Also, noting that “although Nazi atrocities appear to have been the single most 
important causal factor in this chain [of events], the full explanation is multi-causal.”).  
42  Sorin Hostiuc, A Short Introduction to the History of Informed Consent in Great Britain and 
the United States, in THE AGE OF INFORMED CONSENT: A EUROPEAN HISTORY 15, 34 (Sorin Hostiuc 
& Octavian Buda, eds., 2018) (citing Jessica W. Berg et al., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY 
AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 11-12 (2001)) (drawing a contrast to Professor Jessica Berg’s 
characterization of the origins of the legal doctrine of informed consent in the United States).  
43  Id. at 35.  













III. ANALYSIS OF EU LEGISLATION: THE DEBATE SURROUNDING GENETIC 
TESTING, GENETIC COUNSELING45 AND INFORMED CONSENT 
In April 2017, the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union approved the IVDR,46 allowing for a transition period of 
five years and repealing its 1998 predecessor, the In Vitro Medical 
Devices Directive (IVDD),47 as well as a related European Commission 
Decision.48  The IVDR takes effect May 26, 2022, and, because it is an EU 
regulation, is binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all EU 
Member States (Member States) without being transposed into national 
legislation (unlike the 1998 IVDD).49   
The final version of the IVDR was built on years of legislative debate 
that included the expert opinions of various healthcare and medical 
organizations and industry-related stakeholders.  The EU Commission first 
submitted proposed legislation in September 2012.  The explanatory 
memorandum that accompanied the draft legislation explained: 
 
The existing regulatory framework for in vitro diagnostic medical 
devices has demonstrated its merits but has also come under 
criticism in recent years.  In an internal market with 32 participating 
countries and subject to constant scientific and technological 
progress, substantial divergences in the interpretation and 
application of the rules have emerged, thus undermining the main 
objectives of the Directive, i.e. the safety and performance of [in 




45  Anna Middleton et al., Direct-to-consumer genetic testing: where and how does genetic 
counseling fit?, 14 PERSONALIZED MED. 249, 250 (2017) (explaining that ‘genetic counseling’ is 
defined generally by “professional bodies around the world as a client-centered communication 
process, designed to help people understand and adapt to the medical and psycho-social consequences 
of either having, being at-risk from or passing on a genetic condition.”). 
46  Regulation (EU) 2017/746 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on 
in vitro diagnostic medical devices and repealing Directive 98/79/EC and Commission Decision 
2010/227/EU, Apr. 5, 2017, 2017 O.J. (L 117) 176 [hereinafter IVDR]. 
47  Directive 98/79/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 1998 on in 
vitro diagnostic medical devices, Oct. 27, 1998, 1998 O.J. (L 331) 1 [hereinafter IVDD].  
48  Commission Decision 2010/227/EU of 19 April 2010 on the European Databank for Medical 
Devices, adopted in implementation of Directives 90/385/EEC, 93/42/EEC and 98/79/EC, Apr. 19, 
2010, 2010 O.J. (L 102) 45.  
49  EUR. UNION, Regulations, Directives and other acts (Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en. 
50  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on in vitro 
diagnostic medical devices, COM (2012) 541 final (Sept. 26, 2012).  











In April 2013, rapporteur Dr. Peter Liese of the EU Parliament’s 
Environment, Public Health, Food and Safety (ENVI) Committee 
submitted a draft report responding to the Commission’s suggested 
regulatory changes.51  Rapporteur Dr. Liese, as a member of the EU 
Parliament’s European People’s Party (EPP), commissioned a paper from 
the Centre for European Law at the University of Passau that attempted to 
provide legal justification for broader and deeper regulation of genetic 
testing.  This paper is commonly known as the “Passau Opinion.”52  In 
October 2013, the EU Parliament initially adopted the amendments 
endorsed by the ENVI draft report, including the so-called “Liese 
Amendments,” which were based on the analysis presented in the Passau 
Opinion.53 
The amended definition of “medical device” sparked controversy 
because it included devices with a “direct or indirect medical purpose” that 
“provid[ed] information concerning direct or indirect impacts on health.”54  
Such a broad mandate likely would have regulated all types of genetic 
testing, including all types of DTC genetic testing.  Furthermore, a Joint 
Statement issued by four key stakeholders—the PHG Foundation, the 
European Genetic Alliances’ Network, the European Alliance for 
Personalised Medicine and the Wellcome Trust—explained that such a 
long regulatory arm could cause confusion over the types of devices 
covered (e.g., “lifestyle apps” such as Fitbit), and potentially jeopardize 
the competitiveness of EU Member States by “stifl[ing] innovation.”55 As 
a result, consumers would likely experience a “delay in access to 
 
 
51  Draft Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on in vitro diagnostic medical devices, COM (2012) 0541 (Apr. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Liese Report]. 
Separately, the version of the ENVI report from the Plenary sitting is dated October 10, 2013. Draft 
Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on in vitro 
diagnostic medical devices, COM (2012) 0541 (Oct. 10, 2013).  
52  See Options for Action of the European Union in the Area of Human Genetics and 
Reproductive Medicine in the Light of the Proposal for a Regulation on In Vitro Diagnostic Devices, 
CENTRUM FÜR EUROPARECHT AN DER UNIVERSITÄT PASSAU (2013) [hereinafter PASSAU OPINION].  
53  Lawford Davies Denoon & Axon Lawyers, Opinion: The Competence of the European 
Union to Legislate in Relation to Certain Amendments Endorsed by the European Parliament in 
Connection with a Commission Proposal for an In Vitro Diagnostic Device Regulation, ALLIANCE OF 
EUROPEAN LIFE SCIENCES LAW FIRMS 1, 12 (FEB. 19, 2014), 
https://www.eshg.org/fileadmin/eshg/documents/IVD/ESHG_Opinion_19_February_2014_final.pdf 
[hereinafter ALLIANCE OPINION]. 
54  Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 22 October 2013 on the proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on in vitro diagnostic medical devices, 
amend. 42, proposed art. 2.1(1), COM (2012) 541 (Oct. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Adopted Amendments].  
55  PHG Foundation et al., Joint statement on amendments tabled in the report of the Committee 
on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety on the proposal for a regulation on in vitro 
diagnostic medical devices, PHG FOUNDATION 2 (Oct. 2013), 













healthcare products” without a measurable benefit to patient safety.56 
The contentious Liese Amendments, with a focus on genetic medicine, 
defined “device for genetic testing” as “an in vitro diagnostic medical 
device the purpose of which is to identify a genetic characteristic of a 
person which is inherited or acquired during prenatal development.”57  
Again, this is an overly broad definition that, according to the 
stakeholder’s Joint Statement, attempted to cover “any test that seeks to 
identify a genetic variant regardless of whether it is found commonly in 
populations or is causally linked to illness or disease.”58  Finally, the 
proposed Article 4a, entitled “Genetic information, counselling and 
informed consent,” caused the most controversy because it tried to 
regulate “the practice of genetic medicine,” listing very specific 
requirements for who may order a test (i.e., only a medical doctor),59 the 
type of information provided to patients, how patients are counseled 
before and after testing, and how patient consent is granted (i.e., expressly 
and in writing only) and revoked (i.e., in writing or orally).60   
Speaking on behalf of the European Society of Human Genetics 
(ESHG)—a non-profit organization based in Vienna, Austria—Dr. David 
Barton, from the Department of Clinical Genetics at Our Lady's Children's 
Hospital in Ireland, explained that the proposed Article 4a was unrealistic 
because “it is common practice for genetic tests to be ordered by other 
healthcare professionals such as genetic counsellors.”61  Furthermore, Dr. 
Barton expressed concern that: 
 
[T]hese proposals, as they stand, restrict legitimate, ethically-
acceptable genetic testing activities such as the screening of 
newborn babies.  They infringe on accepted and acceptable clinical 
practice when [the EU] should simply be regulating IVDs, 
effectively hijacking a sound and important Regulation to interfere 
with carefully regulated clinical practice, and infringing on patients’ 
 
 
56  Id. 
57  Adopted Amendments, supra note 54, amend. 49, proposed art. 2.12(b).  
58  Joint Statement, supra note 55, at 2. 
59  For example, this restriction would prohibit accredited genetic counselors and trained 
midwives from engaging in their professional duties of genetic counseling and routine prenatal 
screening tests. See Joint Statement, supra note 55, at 3. 
60  Adopted Amendments, supra note 54, at amend. 271, proposed art. 4a new.  
61  Antony Blackburn-Starza, ESHG says EU medical devices regulation could pose a risk to 
patients' interests, 825 BIONEWS (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_95253 (last 
visited July 18, 2019). 













The organization EuroGentest echoed a similar concern that the measures 
proposed in Article 4a constituted an attempt “to regulate medical practice 
via device regulation.”63  ESHG’s 2013 Position Statement explained that 
Article 4a places an unfair burden on the medical device user (e.g., the 
laboratory staff conducting a genetic test analysis) to ensure that medical 
professionals who care for the patient meet the regulatory requirements.64  
Accordingly, ESHG concluded that the proposed Article 4a is 
“unworkable in the daily practice of genetic medicine.”65 
Despite the widespread criticism of the Liese Amendments, on October 
22, 2013, the EU Parliament adopted an amended version of the EU 
Commission’s proposal,66 voting for the Liese Amendments.  While the 
Liese Amendments are impractical to implement from a medical device 
user and clinical perspective, they also lack legal authority.67  In February 
2014, in the wake of Parliament’s acceptance of the Liese Amendments, 
the members of the Alliance of European Life Sciences Law Firms issued 
a legal opinion (hereinafter the Alliance Opinion68), concluding that 
Parliament acted beyond the scope of its “legislative competence” and that 
the Passau Opinion “seriously misrepresent[ed] this competence.”69 
First, the Alliance Opinion reasons that the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) Article 168(4)70 limits the scope of any EU 
 
 
62  Id. 
63  New legal opinion finds EU does not have the power to enact radical genetic counselling 
laws, EUROGENTEST 1 (Apr. 2014), 
http://www.eurogentest.org/fileadmin/templates/eugt/pdf/IVDLegalOpinionExecutiveSummaryApril2
014.pdf (EuroGentest was formerly a project funded by the European Commission to harmonize the 
process of genetic testing, from sampling to counseling, across Europe. As of January 2014, the EU 
funding for EuroGentest ended and the organization continued its activities as an integrated part of the 
ESHG).  
64  ESHG Position Statement on the Inclusion of an Article on Genetic Testing in the Proposed 
Regulation on In Vitro Diagnostic Devices, ESHG 1 (May 2013), 
https://www.eshg.org/fileadmin/www.eshg.org/NHGS2013/ESHG_Position_Statement_on_IVD_Reg
ulation.pdf [hereinafter ESHG POSITION STATEMENT]. 
65  Id. at 1. 
66  Adopted Amendments, supra note 54. 
67  EUROGENTEST, supra note 63, at 2-3. 
68  ALLIANCE OPINION, supra note 53, at 1, 12. 
69  Id. at 1, 9 (referencing the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union art. 168(4), June 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 1). The Passau Opinion argued that the 
EU could adopt the Liese Amendments based on general internal market competence (i.e., TFEU art. 
114), and on health competence (i.e., TFEU art. 168(4)), and based on EU case law and several EU 
and other international treaties. See id. at 15-16, 21-24, 33-34. As background, the ESHG requested the 
2014 Alliance legal opinion to provide an assessment of the competence of the EU to legislate certain 
issues raised by the proposed Liese Amendments.  













regulation only to the public health concerns related to the “quality and 
safety for . . . devices for medical use.”71  The Alliance Opinion elaborates 
that any EU measures undertaken on this issue can only address the 
“quality and safety of the devices themselves,” and “cannot be prescriptive 
as to how to practice medicine with medical devices, for example by 
prescribing mandatory patient counselling,” associated with the use of a 
medical device.72  
Second, the Alliance Opinion explains that because the EU does not 
have exclusive competence to act in this area, the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality govern the circumstances in which the Union is 
permitted to take action, rather than the Member States.73  Specifically, the 
Alliance Opinion claims that the Union competence to legislate on in vitro 
diagnostic medical devices does not extend to the practice of medicine in 
relation to these medical devices, in part, because the “[E]uropean 
Commission already stated that matters of informed consent are better 
dealt with at [the] national level.”74  Accordingly, the principle of 
subsidiarity mandates that the decision to impose any such informed 
consent rules should be left up to the Member States.  The EU Parliament 
website explains: 
 
[t]he principle of subsidiarity seeks to safeguard the ability of the 
Member States to take decisions and action and authorises 
intervention by the Union when the objectives of an action cannot 
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can be better 
achieved at Union level, ‘by reason of the scale and effects of the 
proposed action.’75 
 
Furthermore, with respect to the principle of proportionality, the “content 
 
 
June 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 1 [hereinafter TFEU].  
71  ALLIANCE OPINION, supra note 53, at 11 (quoting TFEU art. 168(4)(c): “[the EU] shall 
contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article through adopting in order to 
meet common safety concerns: (c) measures setting high standards of quality and safety for medicinal 
products and devices for medical use.”) (emphasis added).  
72  ALLIANCE OPINION, supra note 53, at 6, 11-13 (explaining that “[A]rticle 168(4) is very 
specific in that Article 168 TFEU can only be relied on as a legal basis for adopting measures to (1) 
meet common safety concerns and (2) set high standards for quality and safety of medical devices.”). 
73  Id. at 13 (referencing TFEU art. 5(3) and Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality). 
74  Id. at 2. 
75  Roberta Panizza, Fact Sheets on the European Union: The principle of subsidiarity, 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Apr. 2019), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/7/the-
principle-of-subsidiarity (last visited July 18, 2019). 











and form” of any Union action must not “exceed what is necessary” to 
achieve the goal.76   
The Alliance Opinion demonstrates that the clear objective of the Liese 
Amendments is to “regulate [the] modalities of genetic counselling”77 and 
informed consent in the Member States.78  As Dr. Barton explained, on 
behalf of the ESHG, “Medical practice, including genetic medicine, is 
organized and delivered in many different ways in different Member 
States” of the EU, and the Liese Amendments “[e]ncroach[] on this 
diversity and seek[] to dictate in detail the arrangements for every clinic 
where a genetic test may be ordered.”79  Yet, any differences that exist 
throughout the EU in genetic counseling and informed consent practices 
do not pose any significant barriers to trade that would require EU-level 
intervention.80  For this reason, the Alliance Opinion underscores that 
Member States hold the legislative power in this area, and are better 
equipped to address the issues of genetic counseling and informed consent 
at the national level where they can properly “account [for] the differences 
in the field of practice of medicine” in their respective country.81   
In fact, the EU ultimately agreed with this reasoning and asserted in 
Recital 9 of the enacted IVDR that: 
 
It appears that it is possible that divergent national rules regarding 
the provision of information and counselling in relation to genetic 
testing might only have an impact on the smooth functioning of the 
internal market to a limited extent. Therefore, it is appropriate to lay 
down only limited requirements in this regard in this Regulation, 
 
 
76  ALLIANCE OPINION, supra note 53, at 2 (citing TFEU art. 5(4)). 
77  Id. at 13. 
78  Id. at 7 (citing TFEU Protocol (No 2) art. 8 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality). Accordingly, the Alliance Opinion concluded that if a regulation were enacted 
incorporating the Liese Amendments, pursuant to TFEU Protocol (No 2) on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and TFEU art. 263, those directly affected could initiate 
proceedings against the regulation in the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on “grounds 
of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a legislative act.” Id. 
79  Blackburn-Starza, supra note 61. 
80  ALLIANCE OPINION, supra note 53, at 13. 
81  Id. See European Patients’ Forum, Patient’s Rights in the European Union, HEALTH RIGHTS 
(2009), http://health-rights.org/index.php/cop/item/patients%E2%80%99-rights-in-the-european-
union-2009 (providing an overview of patients’ rights legislation and policies, including the right to 
informed consent, in EU member states). The European Patients’ Forum (EPF) is an umbrella 
organization founded in 2003 and works with many European patients’ rights groups in support of 
public health and health advocacy. See also Pre-Max Consortium, Patients’ Rights in the European 
Union Mapping eXercise Final Report, European Commission (2016), 
https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/cross_border_care/docs/2018_mapping_patientsrights_fre
p_en.pdf (discussing the legislation, policy, and enforcement of patients’ rights, including the right to 













having regard to the need to ensure constant respect of the 
principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.82 
IV. THE IVDR’S SCOPE AND IMPACT RELATED TO GENETIC TESTING 
If the Liese Amendments to the IVDD on genetic testing had been 
adopted into the new IVDR, Kalokairinou et al. point out that they 
“[w]ould have effectively signaled a ban on most types of DTC genetic 
testing” throughout the EU.83  However, ultimately the EU legislative 
bodies recognized that such amendments exceeded their authority and 
voted instead on a more balanced version of the proposal.  Kalokairinou et 
al. describe the final Regulation text as “pragmatic” because it manages to 
focus on the main goal of the safety and performance of in vitro diagnostic 
medical devices, while “plac[ing] more emphasis on genetic counselling 
and informed consent compared to the [IVDD],” but also “leaving 
Member States leeway to adapt those requirements in their clinical 
practice.”84 
The IVDR, as it goes into effect in 2022, establishes rules for 
“placing,” “making available,” or “putting into service” in vitro diagnostic 
medical devices for human use on the EU market85 and sets considerably 
more stringent scientific and technical requirements than the IVDD.  
Mainly, clinical evidence must demonstrate the intended benefit(s) and 
safety of the device, and a post-market surveillance system must ensure 
ongoing conformity with the Regulation.86  The aim is to provide for 
greater harmonization87 of in vitro diagnostic medical devices throughout 
the EU, by “establish[ing] a robust, transparent, predictable and 
sustainable regulatory framework . . . which ensures a high level of safety 
and health whilst supporting innovation.”88   
The IVDR does apply to genetic testing, and includes DTC genetic 
testing, but only those tests that are health or medical-related—as will be 
explained below. 89  Understanding the parameters of the IVDR requires a 
 
 
82  IVDR, supra note 46, recital 9.  
83  Louiza Kalokairinou et al., Legislation of direct-to-consumer genetic testing in Europe: A 
fragmented regulatory landscape, 9 J. COMMUNITY GENET. 117, 128 (2018).  
84  Id. at 129. 
85  IVDR, supra note 46, at art. 1(1).  
86  See id. at Ch. VI: “Clinical Evidence, Performance Evaluation and Performance Studies,” 
and Ch. VII: “Post-Market Surveillance, Vigilance and Market Surveillance.” 
87  See TFEU, supra note 70, at art. 114. 
88  IVDR, supra note 46, recitals 1-2. See TFEU, supra note 70, art. 168(4).  
89  Technically, the 1998 IVDD did not cover genetic testing. However, as EMERGO, a UL 
Company, specialized in global regulatory consulting explains, “with some rule bending” the IVDD 











close-reading of the definitions of “in vitro diagnostic medical device” 
and “companion diagnostic.”  Article 2(2) defines “in vitro diagnostic 
medical device” as: 
 
[A]ny medical device which is a reagent, reagent product, 
calibrator, control material, kit, instrument, apparatus, piece of 
equipment, software or system, whether used alone or in 
combination, intended by the manufacturer to be used in vitro for 
the examination of specimens, including blood and tissue donations, 
derived from the human body, solely or principally for the purpose 
of providing information on one or more of the following: 
(a) concerning a physiological or pathological process or state; 
(b) concerning congenital physical or mental impairments; 
(c) concerning the predisposition to a medical condition or a 
disease; 
(d) to determine the safety and compatibility with potential 
recipients; 
(e) to predict treatment response or reactions; 
(f) to define or monitoring therapeutic measures. Specimen 
receptacles shall also be deemed to be in vitro diagnostic medical 
devices.90 
 
Article 2(7) defines “companion diagnostic”91 as: 
 
 
informally oversaw genetic tests. Now, under the new IVDR, genetic testing is formally defined as an 
in vitro diagnostic medical device. Ronald Boumans, Understanding Europe’s New Invitro Diagnostic 
Medical Devices Regulation: What manufacturers need to know ahead of IVDR implementation, 
EMERGO (2016), https://www.emergobyul.com/resources/articles/white-paper-eu-ivdr; See also 
European Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment on the Revision of the Regulatory 
Framework for Medical Devices, Accompanying the documents Proposals for Regulations of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on medical devices, and amending Directive 2001/83/EC, 
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 and on in vitro diagnostic medical 
devices, at 13-14, SWD (2012) 274 final (Sept. 26, 2012), https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/487acc33-213b-4fdf-bdbb-8840209a8807/language-en (explaining that despite the IVDD 
not formally regulating genetic testing, out of 200 responses that included mainly industry, healthcare 
professionals and academics, and regulatory bodies, the consensus was that the IVDD covered “[o]nly 
genetic tests that have a medical purpose”). 
90  IVDR, supra note 46, at art. 2(2) (emphasis added).  
91  Companion diagnostics are DNA tests and a subset of the field of study of 
pharmacogenomics, which is “[t]he use of a person’s genomic makeup to predict a drug response, or to 
tailor therapy specifically for that patient.”  Frost & Sullivan, Companion Diagnostics for Oncology, 
ALLIANCE OF ADVANCED BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING (2017), 
https://aabme.asme.org/posts/companion-diagnostics-for-oncology (last visited July 21, 2019). For 
example, in 1998, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the first targeted medicine 
Herceptin. Herceptin shuts off the Human epidermal growth factor receptor 2 (HER2 or HER2/neu) 
protein, expressed by the gene ERBB2, present in abnormally high amounts in about one-quarter to 













[A] device which is essential for the safe and effective use of a 
corresponding medicinal product to92  
identify, before and/or during treatment, patients who are most 
likely to benefit from the corresponding medicinal product; or 
identify, before and/or during treatment, patients likely to be at 
increased risk of serious adverse reactions as a result of treatment 
with the corresponding medicinal product.”93 
 
In Article 2(2), clauses (c) and (e) are entirely new additions to the 
definition of in vitro diagnostic medical device, as compared to the 
definition provided in the 1998 IVDD.  These new clauses specifically 
address the growing trend of gene-based medicine.  As the IVDR Recital 
10 emphatically states, in vitro diagnostic medical devices include “all 
tests that provide information on the predisposition to a medical condition 
or a disease, such as genetic tests,” a reference to clause (2)(c), and “tests 
that provide information to predict treatment response or reactions, such as 
companion diagnostics,” a reference to clause 2(e).94   
Considering the use of the terms “medical condition,” “disease,” and 
“treatment” in clauses 2(c) and (e), the scope of these clauses appears 
limited to health or medical-related genetic tests and companion 
diagnostics and would apparently exclude the other so-called 
“recreational”95 genetic tests related to ancestry, ethnicity, identity (i.e., 
familial ties, to include paternity) and race, as well as those related to 
personality or character traits96 and physical traits (e.g., bitter taste sense, 
 
 
patient’s tumor or for extra copies of the HER2 gene in a patient’s tumor, indicating that Herceptin 
could be an effective treatment for that patient’s breast cancer. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
Personalized Medicine and Companion Diagnostics Go Hand-in-Hand, 
https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/personalized-medicine-and-companion-
diagnostics-go-hand-hand (last visited July 21, 2019). 
92  Directive 2001/83/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 
on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, art. 1(2), 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67 
(defining “Medicinal product”) (emphasis added).  
93  IVDR, supra note 46, at art. 2(2).  
94  Id. recital 10 (emphasis added). 
95  Heike Felzmann, ‘Just a Bit of Fun’: How Recreational is Direct-to-Customer Genetic 
Testing?, 21 THE NEW BIOETHICS 20, 30-31 (2015) (citing J. P. Evans, Recreational genomics; what's 
in it for you?, 10 GENET. MED. 709 (2008) (using for the first time the term ‘recreational genomics’)) 
(explaining that the term is often used to describe “genetic testing for ancestry or other non-health 
concerns from genetic testing for health factors,” or to describe “any testing that does not have clear 
diagnostic and health management targets.”). 
96  Online dating companies, U.S.-based GenePartner, Instant Chemistry, DNA Romance, and 
Pheramor to name just a few, have entered the DTC genetic testing market, trading saliva for the 
chance of finding your perfect match. Spareroom is a United Kingdom-based company that is piloting 
a similar genetic matching service to help renters find their ideal roommate based on a DNA sample 











earwax type, eye color, salty versus sweet preference, and sleep 
movement).97 GeneWatch UK similarly concludes in its regulatory 
summary of the IVDR that “[g]enetic tests which claim to predict disease 
risk or drug response, or diagnose a medical condition, clearly fall within 
the scope of the Regulation, whilst genetic ancestry or paternity tests do 
not.”98  Slokenberga also asserts that the entire definition, Article 2(2), 
refers only to “health related” in vitro diagnostic medical devices.99  
Additionally, with respect to Article 2(7) “companion diagnostics,” 
GeneWatch UK finds that, “[g]enetic tests . . . used to make 
recommendations regarding supplements, functional foods, or further 
medical testing may be classed as ‘companion diagnostics.’”100  This is 
because the EU prefers to take a stricter view in cases of doubt about such 
“borderline products,” labeling them as a “medicinal product” so as to err 
on the side of protecting the consumer.101  For these reasons, it is clear that 
the IVDR is applicable to all health or medical-related genetic tests and 
companion diagnostics, including all such DTC tests.   
Yet, there remains some ambiguity as to what types of DTC genetic 
tests are categorized as health or medical-related.  For example, 
Slokenberga questions whether the IVDR applies to tests that identify 
gene responses to nutrition, referred to as nutrigenetics.102  GeneWatch UK 
recently echoed this concern, unsure of whether the IVDR definition, 
specifically Article (2)(2)(e), would encompass so-called “lifestyle” 
genetic tests, which try “[t]o predict the body’s response to diet or 
exercise.”103  The obvious argument is that genetic-based individual diet 
 
 
and a personality test. Jackie Mansky, The Dubious Science of Genetics-Based Dating, SMITHSONIAN 
(Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/dubious-science-genetics-based-
dating-180968151/; Emily Mullin, These DNA testing companies are mainly trying to sell you other 
stuff, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611002/these-dna-
testing-companies-are-mainly-trying-to-sell-you-other-stuff/. 
97  Dna Reports List, 23ANDME, INC., https://www.23andme.com/dna-reports-list/ (last visited 
July 21, 2019). 
98  The EU’s In Vitro Diagnostics (IVD) Regulation: a summary of the regulatory requirements 
for software and genetic tests, GENEWATCH UK 2 (Dec. 2017), 
http://www.genewatch.org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/IVDReg_GWbrief_fin.pdf. 
99  Santa Slokenberga, Direct-to-consumer Genetic Testing: Changes in the EU Regulatory 
Landscape, 22 EUR. J. HEALTH LAW 463, 473 (2015) (discussing the scope of the proposed IVDR 
provisions). 
100  GENEWATCH UK, supra note 98, at 3.  
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medicines for human use, EUR. PARL. 5 (2015), 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/554174/ 
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and exercise advice do have a health-related or medical purpose and could 
reasonably be viewed as falling under the IVDR provisions.104  Ultimately, 
in the lead up to and after the 2022 IVDR effective date, the EU Member 
States and the EU Commission will need to determine if these types of 
“lifestyle” tests fall into either the recreational or the health or medical 
category.105   
Having established the application of the IVDR to health or medical-
related genetic tests, including such DTC genetic tests, it is imperative to 
consider the territorial scope and application of the Regulation.  The IVDR 
territorial scope is broad because it introduces in Article 6 the concept of 
“distance sales.”  Article 6(1) states: “A device offered by means of 
information society services, as defined in point (b) of Article 1(1) of 
Directive 2015/1535, to a natural or legal person established in the Union 
shall comply with this Regulation.”  The referenced 2015 Directive 
defines “information society services” as “any service normally provided 
for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual 
request of a recipient of services.”106  Article 6(2) also addresses the 
situation where a device may not be “placed on the market,” but is used 
within a commercial context—either in return for payment or free of 
charge—to provide a “diagnostic or therapeutic service.”107  These IVDR 
provisions mark the EU’s first regulatory attempt to capture the e-
commerce sector as it relates specifically to the offering of genetic tests 
originating in third countries, like the U.S, which are then made available 
to EU residents.   
While it is a valiant effort to impose the IVDR technical and scientific 
requirements on non-EU online DTC genetic testing companies, the 
regulation lacks specifics about its enforcement mechanism and possible 
 
 
intake;” and other companies Nutrigene and LifeDNA sell vitamin supplements based on your DNA 
sample). 
104  Liese Report, supra note 51, at 59 (stating that “[t]hese tests may have at least indirectly very 
severe consequences to people's health,” providing the example of a patient who needs to lose weight 
for health reasons but uses a low-quality nutrigenetic or lifestyle test that does not deliver the promised 
results); GENEWATCH UK, supra note 98, at 2. 
105  See IVDR, supra note 46, recital 8, art. 3 (explaining that to maintain consistency among the 
EU Member States, especially in “borderline cases,” the EU Commission either upon request by a 
Member State or by its own initiative, after consulting with the Medical Device Coordination Group 
(MDCG), shall “determine whether or not a specific product, or category or group of products, falls 
within the definitions of ‘in vitro diagnostic medical device’ or ‘accessory for an in vitro diagnostic 
medical device.’”). 
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of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services)., 2015 O.J. (L 241) 1.  
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action to be taken against violators.108  Rather, IVDR Article 106 requires 
the Member States to devise and implement the penalties for infringement 
of the rules.109  As Slokenberga reminds us, the EU consumer will expect 
that all tests available for purchase within the EU meet the same rigorous 
standards, regardless of origination.110  For now, consumers and industry 
must wait and see what happens when the IVDR becomes effective in 
May 2022.   
Lastly, the provision in the IVDR that demonstrates how far the EU is 
able and willing to legislate on the issue of informed consent is Article 4, 
entitled “Genetic information, counselling and informed consent.”111  This 
is a new provision that did not exist in the 1998 IVDD.  Moreover, it is 
drastically different from the 2013 proposed Article 4a, which was 
discussed earlier in connection with the Liese Amendments.   
This final enacted version requires “Member States” to ensure the 
provision of “relevant information on the nature, the significance and the 
implications of the genetic test, as appropriate,” to an individual (or her 
legal representative) who is being genetically tested for “medical 
purposes” only, and strictly in a “healthcare” setting.112  “Healthcare” is 
defined as “health services provided by health professionals to patients to 
assess, maintain or restore their state of health, including the prescription, 
dispensation and provision of medicinal products and medical 
devices[.]”113  Furthermore, the requirement is limited to genetic tests used 
for the medical purposes of “diagnostics, improvement of treatment, 
predictive or prenatal testing.”114  Under these specific circumstances, 
“Member States” must ensure that there is “appropriate access to 
counselling” for genetic tests that “provide information on the genetic 
predisposition for medical conditions and/or diseases which are generally 
considered to be untreatable”115 (unless a diagnosis is merely being 
confirmed by a genetic test or a companion diagnostic is being used).116  
Finally, Article 4 expressly states that Member States have the latitude to 
adopt or maintain measures at a national level that are “more protective of 
patients, more specific or which deal with informed consent.”  Notably, 
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114  IVDR, supra note 46, art. 4(11). 
115  Id. art. 4(2). 













Article 4 specifically places the burden on Member States to ensure its 
requirements are met, allowing them to craft the necessary measures at the 
national level.117  This is a clear response to the earlier criticism of the 
2013 amendments that the EU was interfering with the day-to-day practice 
of medicine under the guise of a regulation on in vitro diagnostic medical 
devices.   
With respect to Member States’ rights, Article 1(8) also makes clear 
that the IVDR in no way affects the right of a Member State to “restrict the 
use of any specific type of device in relation to aspects not covered by [the 
IVDR].”118  Additionally, Article 1(9) underscores that the Member States 
retain the right to impose national laws “concerning the organisation, 
delivery or financing of health services and medical care” to include, but 
not limited to, requiring a medical prescription for certain devices, 
permitting only certain health professionals or health care institutions to 
dispense or use certain devices, and mandating specific professional 
counseling to accompany the use of certain devices.119  Consequently, in 
the context of DTC genetic tests, these IVDR provisions will not affect the 
current bans in place in some EU countries, like Germany and France,120 
on DTC sales of genetic tests; nor do they prevent other EU countries from 
imposing certain restrictions or bans on DTC genetic tests sold within their 
jurisdiction.121 
V. THE GDPR AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE IVDR: THE STATUS OF 
INFORMED CONSENT IN THE DATA PRIVACY REGULATION 
Since the IVDR debate concluded that national legislatures were better 
positioned to craft informed consent requirements and that any informed 
consent mandate by the EU would be an overreach of the Union’s 
authority, it is no surprise that only a few years later the GDPR refrained 
from broaching the specific issue of “informed consent” within the context 
of genetic data processing.  For these well-founded reasons, among others, 
the phrase “informed consent” is nowhere to be found in the Regulation’s 
text.  While the GDPR does have specific provisions on “consent” in 
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general, and for special data categories (i.e., sensitive data), including 
genetic data, where “explicit consent,” is required, any mention of the 
informed consent process is obviously absent from the Regulation’s 
text.122   
Article 9.1 of the GDPR specifies that the processing of data related to 
sensitive categories (i.e., race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, political 
opinions, trade union membership, religious and philosophical beliefs, 
genetics, biometrics, and health) are prohibited unless one of the ten 
exceptions of Article 9.2 applies.  Exception 9.2(a) permits the data 
subject to provide “explicit consent” to the processing of such sensitive 
data.  When it comes to genetic and health-related data, this requirement of 
explicit consent blurs the distinction for the layman between “explicit 
consent” and “informed consent.”  Let us be clear, “explicit consent” is no 
substitute for “informed consent.”   
Furthermore, even though the GDPR carves out a separate category for 
the processing of sensitive personal data and imposes a stricter consent 
requirement for this category, it fails to define “explicit consent.”  This is 
problematic for consumers, particularly when considering the business 
model of online DTC genetic testing companies.  The companies remain at 
liberty to define for themselves “explicit consent.”  Moreover, consumers 
are likely to misinterpret the stricter consent requirement as an equal 
replacement for “informed consent”—which it is not. 
While the focus of the GDPR is no doubt the protection of one’s data, 
the health sphere and data privacy world collide when online DTC genetic 
testing companies acquire and analyze biospecimens (e.g., saliva, hair, or 
cheek cell samples, etc.) that are considered some of the most sensitive, 
revealing, and unique identifying information that humans possess.123  
Before discussing any further the topic of informed consent within the 
context of DTC genetic testing and the GDPR, it is necessary to 
understand the relevant Regulation’s definitions (presented in order of 
appearance in the Definitions section). 
 
“personal data” means: 
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
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person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who 
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to 
an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, 
an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the 
physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity of that natural person[.]124 
 
“‘consent’ of the data subject” means: 
any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of 
the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a 
clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of 
personal data relating to him or her[.]125 
  
“genetic data” means:  
personal data relating to the inherited or acquired genetic 
characteristics of a natural person which give unique information 
about the physiology or the health of that natural person and which 
result, in particular, from an analysis of a biological sample from 
the natural person in question[.]126 
 
Although the “consent” definition includes the term “informed,” the 
required provision of information only relates to the processing of 
personal data.  The GDPR’s consent requirement solely deals with the data 
subject’s agreement to the specified data processing.  Furthermore, the 
Article 9 requirement for “explicit consent” is limited solely to the 
processing of sensitive data, such as genetic data.  To reiterate, “informed 
consent” as a doctrine and healthcare standard is absent from the text of 
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VI. WHY EU CONSUMERS OF DTC GENETIC TESTS SHOULD BE 
CONCERNED ABOUT THE GDPR’S LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT 
GUIDELINES 
Data processing and genetic testing are two very distinct subject 
matters, but when the GDPR addresses the processing of genetic data as 
one of the “special categories” of personal data (i.e., “sensitive data”), 
these two separate issues intersect.128  The GDPR affords the data derived 
from biological samples special consideration, so consequently, a need 
arises to balance data privacy with bioethical principles, and even 
healthcare standards within the context of DTC services.   
This article focuses on the challenges involving the consent process 
with respect to DTC genetic testing.  Just as consent to data processing is a 
pillar of the GDPR data privacy regime,129 similarly informed consent is a 
core element of healthcare practice and biomedical research on human 
participants.  Before proceeding, it is important to understand the 
evolution and legal basis of informed consent in healthcare and 
bioethics130 within the EU and the international community.  
Informed consent is based on the ethical and legal concept of patient 
autonomy (i.e., “You as the patient have the right to make decisions about 
your own health and medical conditions.”).131  Concerning modern-day 
medical research on humans, the Nuremberg Code established that “[t]he 
voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.”132  This 
was the first of ten principles enumerated in the Nuremberg Code.133  
Subsequently, in 1964, the World Medical Association (WMA) drafted the 
DoH, which furthered the development of international guidelines for 
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ethical research on humans.134  The WMA continuously updates the DoH, 
most recently revising it at the 64th WMA General Assembly in 2013.135  
The DoH has an entire section with several provisions devoted to informed 
consent.136   
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter),137 
which legally binds EU institutions and EU Member States, echoes the 
principles of the Nuremberg Code and the DoH.  In Article 3 “Right to the 
integrity of the person,” the Charter states that in the areas of medicine and 
biology, “the free and informed consent of the person concerned” must be 
respected.138  Additionally, the Council of Europe’s 1997 Oviedo 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo Convention or 
Convention),139 states in Chapter II - Consent, Art. 5: 
 
An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the 
person concerned has given free and informed consent to it. This 
person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the 
purpose and nature of the intervention as well as on its 
consequences and risks. The person concerned may freely withdraw 
consent at any time.140 
 
Vera Lúcia Raposo describes Article 5 on informed consent as “one of the 
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cornerstones of the convention.”141 
The Oviedo Convention also addresses in Chapter IV – Human 
Genome the specific need for genetic counseling when predictive genetic 
tests are conducted “[t]o identify the subject as a carrier of a gene 
responsible for a disease or to detect a genetic predisposition or 
susceptibility to a disease.”142  The Convention also mandates that such 
tests only be done for health purposes or for scientific research linked to 
health purposes (e.g., other possible discriminatory reasons are prohibited 
such as employment or health insurance coverage).143  Raposo hails the 
prohibition of genetic discrimination as one of the Convention’s key 
achievements, which reinforces the principles declared in the UNESCO 
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights.144 
The Oviedo Convention is the first international attempt at a legally 
binding instrument to address the challenges of biomedicine and bioethics.  
Yet, as Raposo underscores, it was necessary to craft it in very “broad and 
generic” terms to reach some degree of consensus.145  Ultimately, the 
Convention has little direct legal effect because it fails to sanction any 
violations of its norms.  Furthermore, the Convention only grants the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) a limited advisory role, which 
leaves the Court unable to enforce the Convention.146  Raposo explains, 
however, that these constraints have not stopped the ECtHR from 
increasingly mentioning the Oviedo Convention in its decisions.147   
To date, twenty-nine countries—a mix of EU Member States and 
Members of the Council of Europe (e.g., Georgia, Switzerland, Turkey)—
have signed and ratified the Convention, albeit several countries with 
reservations.148  Notably, the United Kingdom and the EU Member States 
of Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, and Malta have neither signed nor 
ratified the Oviedo Convention.  The five EU Member States that signed 
the Convention, but never ratified it are Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
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Poland, and Sweden.   
The Council of Europe crafted additional protocols to the Oviedo 
Convention to address certain biomedical and bioethical issues in more 
depth.  One such protocol is the “Additional Protocol to the Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning Genetic Testing for Health 
Purposes,” (hereinafter Protocol on Genetic Testing) which opened for 
signature in 2008 and entered into force on July 1, 2018.149  To date, five 
countries have ratified it, including the three EU Member States of 
Norway, Portugal, and Slovenia.   
The Scope of the Protocol on Genetic Testing is limited to tests that are 
conducted for health reasons and aim to identify the genetic traits of a 
person that are inherited or acquired during prenatal development.150  
Article 7(1) requires that all these genetic tests for health purposes be 
performed under individual medical supervision.151  Chapter IV – 
Information, genetic counselling, and consent Articles 8 and 9 reaffirm the 
consent requirements in Article 5 of the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine.  Specifically, Article 8(1) mandates that the appropriate 
information be provided to a person prior to him or her undergoing a 
genetic test, to include the “[t]he purpose and the nature of the test, as well 
as the implications of its results.”152  Article 8(2) further requires that 
appropriate genetic counseling be available for a person who undertakes a 
“predictive genetic test[],”153 which is defined as a test predicting a 
monogenic disease, detecting a genetic predisposition or susceptibility to a 
disease, or identifying the person as a healthy carrier of a gene responsible 
for a disease.154  Article 8(2) defines standards for the genetic counseling, 
explaining that it must be “non-directive,” and the “form and extent” of 
the counseling will depend on the meaning of the test results and their 
importance for “the person or the members of his or her family, including 
possible implications concerning procreation choices.”155 Article 9 
mandates that an individual give “free and informed consent” prior to any 
 
 
149  Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning 
Genetic Testing for Health Purposes, CETS No. 203, art. 2 (Nov. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Protocol for 
Genetic Testing]. 
150  Id. art 2.  
151  Id. art. 7(1). 
152  Id. art. 8(1). 
153  Oviedo Convention, supra note 138, art. 12 (defining predictive genetic tests). 
154  Protocol for Genetic Testing, supra note 149, art. 8(2). 
155  “Non-directive” is a clinical term defined by Oxford Dictionary as: “That does not direct; 
(Psychology) that does not give or involve instructions on how to proceed.”  So, under these 
circumstances the person would make his own choice freely. Non-directive, LEXICO, 
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genetic test on her, and that consent may be “freely withdrawn” at any 
time.156 
The Protocol on Genetic Testing acknowledged in 2008 the continued 
growth of the DTC genetic testing industry, and that consumers would 
have direct access to testing outside of the traditional healthcare system.157  
Consequently, Article 7(2) does envisage a scenario where a ratifying 
government to the Protocol on Genetic Testing permits an exception to the 
general rule that requires “individualized medical supervision” for health-
related genetic tests.158  It is incumbent upon the government to determine 
the appropriate circumstances to allow for such an exception, ensuring that 
the other provisions of the Protocol on Genetic Testing are met (e.g., 
provision of information pre-test, free and informed consent and genetic 
counseling).  However, the carve-out provision is ambiguous because the 
final sentence of Article 7(2) prohibits its use if a genetic test has 
“important implications” for the health of the person, his family members, 
or for procreation decisions.159  This final sentence ultimately undermines 
the utility of the exception.  It is unlikely that a government could 
determine on a broad scale which test results have “important” 
significance since, arguably, the impact of the results is highly subjective.  
The extremely personal nature of a test result means that it affects each 
person and family member differently.  Furthermore, it would be 
extremely burdensome and nearly impossible for a government to apply 
the exception widely to DTC genetic tests where the services and test 
results differ extensively among companies.  Moreover, a government 
would be overreaching its authority and encroaching on one’s right to 
private life160 if it presumed that it could assess the level of importance 
that each person and their family attribute to a test result.   
The Explanatory Report to the Protocol on Genetic Testing explains 
that each state is left to determine how to best implement the requirement 
for individualized medical supervision, as well as the exception to it (i.e., 
no individual medical supervision).  The report emphasizes that the goal of 
the Article 7 provision is the “protection of the person concerned.”161  The 
report elaborates that the “authorities or bodies” involved in any decision 
to permit a test to be conducted without individual medical supervision 
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should consider the following factors: 
 
[T]he importance of the potential implications of the test considered 
for the persons on whom it would be carried out or for the members 
of their family, the ease of interpretation of the results and, if 
appropriate, the treatment possibilities for the disease or disorder 
concerned.162 
 
Furthermore, the report highlights that the decision could depend on 
whether a person carries out the test entirely on his or her own by using a 
mail-order kit, for example, or whether a laboratory conducts the 
analysis.163 
Although the Protocol on Genetic Testing envisages a government 
body making these decisions, I contend that government is not in the best 
position to effectively craft requirements for DTC genetic testing.  As I 
explained briefly above, the DTC genetic testing industry poses unique 
challenges to prescribing blanket rules on individual medical supervision.  
Additionally, I argue that the informed consent process in its entirety is 
more pertinent to ensuring DTC genetic tests protect consumers—not 
merely whether a certain type of medical professional is involved. 
The second Oviedo Convention protocol that is relevant for this 
discussion is the “Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine, concerning Biomedical Research” (hereinafter Protocol 
on Biomedical Research).164  Both the Protocol on Biomedical Research 
and the Protocol on Genetic Testing have the shared goal to “protect the 
dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without 
discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental 
freedoms,” each within their respective areas—the former biomedical 
research on human beings and the latter genetic tests for health 
purposes.165   
The Protocol on Biomedical Research forms an important part of the 
discussion on informed consent because DTC genetic testing companies 
often share (i.e., sell or rent in return for money or other types of 
remuneration) an individual’s biospecimen, the data derived from the 
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specimen, or an analysis of the data, with drug manufacturers,166 start-ups, 
and biobanks (i.e., “a collection of biological samples that have been taken 
for the purpose of research”167).168  For example, the widely known DTC 
genetic testing company 23andMe states on its website that “[o]n average, 
a customer who chooses to opt into research contributes to over 230 
studies on topics that range from Parkinson's disease to lupus to asthma 
and more.”169  23andMe reports that it has over ten million customers, and 
more than eighty percent of them have opted to share their data for 
research purposes, and as a result, the company has published more than 
one hundred fifty “peer-reviewed studies in scientific journals.”170   
The impact of DTC genetic testing companies’ direct access via online 
and mail-order to a vast army of research subject volunteers is that the 
biomedical research process is accelerated exponentially.  Haydeh Payami, 
a neurodegenerative disease researcher at the New York State Department 
of Health, commented in 2012 that the strides 23andMe made in 
identifying two genetic variants of Parkinson’s disease from the DNA 
analysis of more than 30,000 people, if done conventionally “[w]ould have 
taken several decades and tens of millions of dollars” —as opposed to the 
eighteen months it took 23andMe.171  DTC genetic testing and the 
biomedical research that results from it clearly break the traditional mold 
of recruiting patients to participate in disease studies.  As Grunbaum’s 
Discover magazine article notes, it may typically take more than ten years 
to obtain just a few thousand patients needed to participate in certain 
disease studies.172 
23andMe has expanded its global partnerships.  In 2015, China’s WuXi 
Healthcare Ventures, the investment arm of WuXi PharmaTech,173 was 
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one of the investors who contributed to raising $115 million for 
23andMe.174  More recently, in 2018, the global pharmaceutical giant 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), headquartered in the United Kingdom, 
announced its collaboration in a multi-year agreement where it will be 
23andMe’s “exclusive collaborator” for drug target discovery programs.175  
GSK will have access to 23andMe’s extensive database and proprietary 
statistical analytics to drive its research.176  The financial benefit to both 
GSK and 23andMe is significant.  The two companies will share proceeds 
from new treatments and medicines that result from their collaboration.  
GSK also has made a $300 million equity investment in 23andMe.177   
The few examples of just one DTC genetic testing company—
23andMe—demonstrate the rapid expansion of the DTC genomics 
industry and the growing need to ensure that consumer participation in 
“for-profit” research is supported by rigorous informed consent guidelines.  
It is imperative that these guidelines be specifically designed for DTC 
genetic research.  The Protocol on Biomedical Research serves as a 
starting point for crafting such guidelines.178  The following provisions 
from the protocol are most relevant to the DTC genetic testing companies’ 
business model and describe the type of information that consumers would 
likely need to make an educated decision to participate in research. 
Chapter IV – Information and Consent, Article 13 - Information for 
research participants, requires that potential participants be given 
“adequate information in a comprehensible form.” It specifies in Article 
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the overall plan and the possible risks and benefits of the research project, 
and include the opinion of the ethics committee.”179  Article 13(2) explains 
that before an individual is asked to participate in research, the consent 
should cover several key issues, which are listed in paragraph (2)(i)-(viii). 
Article 13(2)(iv) is a provision that intersects with the goals of the GDPR, 
by addressing the methods for ensuring the confidentiality of personal data 
and respect for private life.  Article 13(2)(v) requires that participants have 
access to information derived from the research that is of any relevance to 
them, as well as access to the results.  Additionally, Article 13(2)(vii) 
mandates that any potential further uses, including commercial uses, of the 
“research results, data or biological materials” be disclosed to the research 
participant.180  Article 13(2)(viii) requires the disclosure of the source of 
the funding of a research project.181  Finally, Article (13)(3) ensures that a 
participant is informed of their right to refuse consent and to withdraw 
consent at any time. 
Chapter IV – Information and Consent, Article 14 – Consent, 
specifically addresses and reaffirms the longstanding international 
principle that research that involves an intervention on a person requires 
“the informed, free, express, specific and documented consent of the 
person.”182  The Explanatory Report to the Protocol on Biomedical 
Research notes that this informed consent rule “emphasizes the autonomy 
of research participants in their relationship with researchers and health 
care professionals.”183  In fact, the concept of individual autonomy is 
prevalent throughout the Charter, as well as the other EU and international 
legal instruments already discussed in relation to informed consent.  
Autonomy is especially relevant to our discussion because it is an essential 
component of the fundamental rights of informed consent and data 
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VII. THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMY: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN EMPOWERING 
AND PROTECTING CONSUMERS OF DTC GENETTICS TESTS 
Uniquely, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights addresses both 
informed consent in a medical context (i.e., Article 3) and the protection of 
personal data, including consent to its processing (i.e., Article 8).  Article 
8 is essentially the forerunner of the GDPR’s concept of data protection.  
As Yvonne McDermott explains, Article 8 marked the first time a “stand-
alone” right to data protection was declared.184  McDermott identifies 
“autonomy” as one of the four “values” that is integral to data protection, 
citing non-binding Recital 7 of the GDPR.185  Recital 7 states, “[n]atural 
persons should have control of their own personal data.” 186  Echoing the 
remarks made by EU Commission President Juncker quoted earlier, she 
further emphasizes that “[t]he principle of autonomy and the related focus 
on consent is also clearly linked to the concept of dignity.”187  I. van 
Ooijen and Helena Vrabec similarly highlight that one of the main 
intentions of EU legislators in drafting the GDPR was to “strengthen[] 
individual control,” based on early policy discussions and non-binding 
Recitals 7 and 68.188  They also reiterate the point made by McDermott 
and President Juncker that “[i]ndividual control, in particular with regard 
to one’s person, has been described as a reflection of fundamental values 
such as autonomy, privacy, and human dignity.”189 
While autonomy is critical to an individual’s ability to exercise her 
fundamental right to informed consent (i.e., health and research-related) 
and data protection, it also poses challenges that put the individual at risk.  
One of the biggest threats to an individual making an autonomous decision 
is the individual’s lack of a clear understanding of the choices presented, 
including the potential risks, benefits, and consequences.  For example, 
concerning data processing, McDermott cites a 2012 GDPR proposal 
where the European Commission stressed that “individuals are often 
neither aware nor in control of what happens to their personal data and 
therefore fail to exercise their rights effectively.”190  Van Ooijen and Vrabec 
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discuss the GDPR from a behavioral perspective and identify both 
“information overload” and “information complexity” as significant 
threats to individual control at what they call the “information receiving 
stage.”191  They explain that the “overload—of information poses a threat to 
individuals’ ability and motivation to scrutinize the key details that are 
necessary to make informed privacy decisions.”192  Moreover, they cite a 
Norwegian study that demonstrated it took nearly thirty-two hours to 
simply read the text of the terms and conditions of thirty-three smartphone 
applications (i.e., 1,920 minutes or approximately fifty-eight minutes per 
application), which did not account for understanding the policy or its 
consequences.193  They also note that disclosures are only becoming “longer 
and more complex” as technology progresses, which increasingly places a 
“strain on individuals’ cognitive functioning.”194  They conclude that there 
are “[i]nformation asymmetries between the individual and the data 
collector” because of the “black box” nature of data processing and the 
subsequent “abstract” explanations provided to consumers.195   
A similar challenge exists with the health and research-related 
informed consent process, particularly with respect to genetics and DTC 
genetic testing.  In fact, the 2008 Explanatory Report to the Protocol on 
Genetic Testing warns that “[t]he results of genetic analysis are often 
complex and a proper understanding of their implications is, in many 
cases, difficult to understand for the persons concerned.”196  Similarly, Dr. 
Emilia Niemiec explains that “[g]enetics is a relatively advanced subset of 
biology, and the task of successfully communicating genetic concepts to a 
public unfamiliar with the subject can be challenging.”197  Moreover, a 
study by Amanda Singleton et al. found that consumers may get an 
inaccurate view of the benefits, risks and limitations of online genetic tests 
based on the information presented on a DTC genetic testing company 
website.198  Singleton and her colleagues reviewed the website content of 
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twenty-three health-related DTC genetic testing companies.199  Their 
findings indicated that on the main website pages, consumers are “exposed 
to an average of six times as many benefits as risks and limitations.” 200  The 
study concluded that most companies don’t provide a balanced view of the 
benefits, risks, and limitations, and even presented conflicting information, 
thus skewing consumers’ perspectives and understanding of the genetic 
testing services.201  Dr. Renee Sterling evaluated the promotion and sales 
strategy of online DTC companies offering nutrigenetic testing services in 
2006, finding the websites lacked “[a]dequate and transparent information 
for informed-decision-making and rarely highlighted the importance of 
consumer consultation with a genetics professional.”202  The asymmetrical 
situation described earlier by van Ooijen and Vrabec concerning data 
processing applies here as well because the consumer is at a disadvantage 
in grasping the complexity of the genetic testing service’s characteristics 
and consequences.203   
As for-profit companies, it is no surprise that the DTC genetic testing 
companies’ websites slant the information in favor of a company’s 
services to encourage consumers to buy genetic tests.204  Additionally, DTC 
genetic testing advertisements frequently appeal to the consumer by 
portraying the service as one that “provides empowering knowledge about 
one’s body—a clever framing strategy that promotes a sense of personal 
entitlement to that knowledge,” as noted by Rose Geransar and Edna 
Einsiedel in their 2008 article.205  Yet, the irony is that this knowledge in 
and of itself has little utility to a consumer if she lacks the resources and 
tools to appropriately judge the information both at the pre-test (i.e., pre-
purchase) and post-test (i.e., the genetic test results) stages.  A significant 
detrimental consequence is that individual autonomy—the linchpin of 
informed consent—is severely undermined when a person fails to have a 
fair and complete understanding of the genetic testing options and 
information presented.  Any consent she provides for genetic testing that is 
based on unclear or insufficient information has far less meaning and 
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effect.   
Moreover, when informed consent and data processing consent are both 
essential components of a DTC genetic testing purchase, a lack of 
transparency in one area reverberates throughout the entire commercial 
transaction.  The consumer’s loss of control and weakened autonomy in 
the informed consent process will diminish their control over their 
personal data too.   
During an online DTC genetic test purchase, the informed consent for 
the test itself is inherently intertwined with the consent for data 
processing.  Although the two consent processes are different, they each 
demand the delivery to the consumer of clear, impartial, and adequate 
information.  For example, if a consumer does not satisfactorily 
understand the health benefits, risks, and consequences of submitting a 
biospecimen for genetic testing, she likely won’t comprehend adequately 
the type of personal genetic data that is being collected, processed, stored, 
reused, and sold.  Thus, a consumer’s degree of understanding in the 
informed consent process impacts her selection of data protection options.  
This is one of the key reasons why it is imperative that online DTC genetic 
testing companies develop robust informed consent procedures.  The 
status quo results in a consumer’s loss of individual control over her health 
and medical decisions, as well as over her personal data.  
VIII. MOBILIZING INDUSTRY TO STRENGTHEN INFORMED CONSENT 
As the DTC genetic testing industry continues to grow rapidly, there is 
an increasing need to better protect online consumers and inform their 
choices.  Yet, the discussion on the IVDR and the Oviedo Convention 
demonstrates the difficulty of reaching EU consensus on specific informed 
consent rules.  Moreover, as explained previously, there is a real legal 
question as to whether the EU possesses the authority (i.e., limits of 
competence) to regulate the methods and practice of informed consent.  As 
mentioned earlier, the EU has a mandate to ensure public health safety, 
according to TFEU Article 168.206  However, Article 168(7) makes it clear 
that Member States have the power to define their own health policy, 
including the manner in which they deliver health services and medical 
care.207 
Considering TFEU Article 168 and the recent IVDR controversy, the 
development of an EU regulation on informed consent is improbable and 
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unlawful.  Furthermore, individual EU Member State legislative action in 
this area is too sporadic. Kalokairinou et al. found fourteen of twenty-six 
European countries have national legislation on informed consent related 
to genetic testing.208  Additionally, the authors found that ten of these 
fourteen countries, plus six other European countries (i.e., a total of 
sixteen of twenty-six), require genetic counseling for various types of 
genetic tests.209  In most cases, though, European national laws on genetic 
testing do not directly address DTC tests, only tangentially if at all.210  
Notably, some EU Member States, such as France and Germany, have 
informed consent and genetic testing laws that are highly restrictive, partly 
in an attempt to prevent consumer access to certain DTC genetic tests 
within their jurisdiction.211  Rachel Thompson and Michael McNamee 
explain this type of reactive legislation is known as the “whiplash 
effect,”212 where the restrictions are “disproportionate” and go beyond 
what is necessary to protect individuals.213  Yet, there are other Member 
States like Luxembourg, Poland, and Romania that have no legislation on 
genetic testing.  Thus, Kalokairinou et al. have called the status quo a 
“fragmented [regulatory] landscape.”214  Besides, EU and Member State 
regulators are in a reactive mode, trying to catch up to the rapidly growing 
science of personalized genomics and the burst of DTC genetic tests on 
the market.  In fact, not only policymakers but researchers in the health 
field also fell short and failed to mobilize quickly to assess the impact of 
this new technology and its marketing to consumers.215   
Although Member State legislation in this area is currently disjointed, 
there are still possibilities of cooperation between the EU and its Member 
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States to improve informed consent for consumers of DTC genetic tests.  
TFEU Article 168(1) defines the health policy powers of the Union, 
stating, “Union action, which shall complement national policies, shall be 
directed towards improving public health, preventing physical and mental 
illness and diseases, and obviating sources of danger to physical and 
mental health.”  TFEU Article 168(2) grants the EU power to “encourage 
cooperation between the Member States to improve the complementarity 
of their health services in cross-border areas.”216  Additionally, Article 
168(5) provides that the “European Parliament and the Council . . . may 
also adopt incentive measures designed to protect and improve human 
health . . . excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States.”217  These provisions provide the legal authority for the 
EU to support Member States and assist them in coordinating their efforts 
to protect consumers’ right to informed consent in the purchase of online 
DTC genetic tests and participation in related research.   
Consumers, government, and industry are the three key stakeholders 
that must work together to ensure that DTC genetic testing is conducted 
ethically and responsibly.  There is a balance that must be sought between 
the stakeholders’ respective interests of personal autonomy, safety and 
health, and corporate research and innovation.  R. E. van Hellemondt et al. 
contend that “free access to DTC genetic tests strengthens the individuals’ 
autonomy, as protected by the right to private and family life.”218  The 
authors reference the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 7 “Respect 
for private and family life,” and cite several ECtHR cases to support this 
point.219  The authors also argue that the companies have “obligations” to 
obtain informed consent and, in the very least, the EU Member States have 
a “duty” to safeguard the informed consent process.220  This point 
underscores that the burden is shared between the DTC genetic testing 
companies and the EU Member States to ensure the requirements of 
informed consent are fulfilled. 
The EU and its Member States have a key role to play in motivating 
industry action.  There needs to be an EU-wide coordinated campaign to 
improve the education of consumers so that they can demand more from 
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industry and are better informed to exercise their personal autonomy and 
fundamental right to informed consent.  As Rose Geransar and Edna 
Einsiedel explain, there exists a “[s]trong public interest in and perceived 
right of access” to DTC genetic testing services, which requires devoting 
more resources to educating doctors and consumers about genetics, 
disease etiology, and genetic testing issues and concerns.221   
Additionally, the EU can foster state cooperation to combat a growing 
cross-border threat to public health from the online sales of DTC genetic 
testing services that fail to meet the minimum informed consent standards.  
One option to protect consumers is for Member States either individually 
or collectively to impose a temporary sales ban on DTC genetic testing 
companies selling within their territory until they comply with 
internationally acceptable informed consent standards.  Eventually, the 
Member States, with the assistance of the Union, could establish 
performance objectives and standards that DTC genetic testing services 
would have to meet in order to conduct online sales within the EU.  This 
latter option might be in the form of EU guidelines, but most effective 
would be a regulation applicable to all DTC genetic testing services 
regardless of the location of their headquarters or the DNA processing 
lab—in or outside the EU.  In fact, in response to the Liese Amendments, 
the ESHG made a similar proposal, stating: 
 
The ESHG would strongly support Dr. Liese if he were to propose a 
stand-alone Regulation or Directive on genetic testing, within the 
limits of EU competence in healthcare, as we believe that it is only 
by this means that our shared objectives can be achieved.222 
 
Such a regulation would have an extra-territorial application like the 
GDPR, which would be necessary given the online and global nature of 
the DTC genetic testing industry.223   
Lastly, the DTC genetic testing industry should be encouraged to 
improve its standards and self-regulate.  Industry can respond faster and 
more effectively to create stronger informed consent procedures.  
Arguably, the industry understands the complexities of genetic testing 
better than EU and national legislators.  Industry also has the added 
incentive to work hard to gain customer trust, which will expand sales and 
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cultivate the DTC genetic testing business overall.  Furthermore, industry 
may be better positioned to analyze and assess the interaction between 
recently implemented GDPR provisions and newly proposed online 
informed consent procedures.   
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORMING ONLINE INFORMED CONSENT 
Collectively, several EU and international legal instruments, 
particularly the Nuremberg Code, DoH, Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
IVDR, and the Oviedo Convention and its additional protocols, establish a 
clear framework of informed consent principles and standards.  Working 
within this framework, it is imperative that consumers and government 
demand from industry an improved commitment to live up to these 
established values of informed consent.   
The earlier discussion highlighted that the current online informed 
consent process for DTC genetic tests fails to adequately advise 
consumers of the risks, benefits, consequences, alternatives, and the 
probability and severity of the risks occurring.  Additionally, the pre- and 
post-test online interactions lack personalized information and care from a 
certified genetic specialist.  Furthermore, in the interest of building their 
customer base and gaining customer trust, the DTC genetic test companies 
should dedicate more resources to the informed consent process and place 
greater importance on the issue within their corporate management.   
Consequently, the proposed recommendations focus on three areas 
where the most effort should be placed to improve the informed consent 
process—online communication, genetic counseling, and corporate 
management.   
 
A. Recommendation 1—Improve Online Communication 
 
If ordinary healthcare situations present communication challenges in 
the informed consent process,224 an online DTC environment significantly 
amplifies those challenges.  One pitfall of the informed consent process 
that is especially pertinent to online informed consent is the tendency 
towards the use of persuasion.  As Søren Birkeland points out, obtaining 
informed consent can “take[] the form of being ‘very presumed.’”  It may 
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result in a pro forma situation, “these are the pro[s] and those are the 
possible con[s]—please sign this document!”225  These persuasive 
characteristics appear to be inherent to online transactions because they 
demand that you click ‘agree’ if you want to use their services (e.g., buy a 
DNA test). 
Moreover, the online informed consent process is buried in the “lengthy 
and densely worded”226 contract presented to consumers, and it lacks the 
qualities necessary to obtain truly free, voluntary, and informed consent.  
Andelka Philips’ study between 2011 and 2014 of seventy-one DTC 
Genetic Testing companies (i.e., those with terms and conditions publicly 
available) revealed that all the online contracts were “either clickwrap 
(click-through) or browsewrap agreements.”227  The consumer provides 
their consent by clicking on ‘I Agree,’ typically without fully reading and 
understanding the contents.228  As Phillips underscores the “validity of 
consent provided merely through visiting a website is open to 
challenge.”229   
Improving online communication with the consumer entails changes to 
both the content and delivery methods of the information.  The DTC 
genetic testing industry could enhance its objectivity and improve online 
consent if it relied more on the use of unbiased, third-party material (i.e., 
written and audio-visual).  As objectivity increases and persuasiveness 
diminishes, the industry must thoroughly integrate into its business model 
the possibility that a certain portion of prospective customers will choose 
not to complete their purchase or participate in research based on the 
information presented to them in the informed consent process.   
In order to effectively convey the complex information about DNA 
testing, the DTC genetic testing companies should employ more diagrams 
and audio-video technology.  Using visual aids and audio-video to present 
information in a clear, objective manner and engage in a dialogue will 
significantly contribute to consumers’ enhanced understanding of their 
purchase of genetic test information and participation in research.  The 
‘Your DNA, Your Say’230 international project serves as a good model for 
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industry. For example, the researchers involved in the project crafted nine 
films to explain genomic data sharing.231  They realized that “[t]here is a 
real need to ‘socialize’ genomics for publics so that they can make 
informed choices about how and whether to engage with genomic 
technologies.”232  Thus, keenly aware that the public’s knowledge of 
genomics is low, the films and associated survey used the term ‘DNA 
information’ instead of ‘genomics.’233  The films employed the proven use 
of metaphor and narrative to more easily convey complex information and 
connect with participants.234  The researchers also strived to present the 
information in an unbiased, neutral manner.235   
If companies want to compete for market share in the EU (and 
elsewhere), it is advisable that they move away from a contract-centric 
view towards a patient-provider perspective, to ensure their customers are 
well-informed and voluntarily consenting to services and research.  
Moreover, the consent process needs to be viewed as an ongoing 
relationship since the data is stored long term, and there will always be 
new and innovative genetic tests and scientific research opportunities.  
Thus, companies also must create more effective strategies for re-
contacting consumers to seek re-consent for new scientific studies and 
further sharing of data.236  These suggested measures will improve the 
informed consent process. 
 
B.  Recommendation 2—Offer Pre-Test Genetic Counseling 
 
Another critical aspect of informed consent is the information exchange 
and dialogue that exists between the patient and her healthcare provider.  
Birkeland explains that ‘shared decision-making’ (SDM) is one method of 
obtaining informed consent that involves “both parties [the patient and the 
provider] share information; . . . take steps to build a consensus about the 
preferred treatment . . . and that an agreement is reached on the treatment 
to implement.”237  The DTC genetic testing industry could improve online 
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informed consent if it retained genetic counselors to engage with 
customers in the informed consent process, emulating the SDM model.  
Also, it is imperative that the DTC companies provide genetic counseling 
services free-of-charge for consumers to ensure fairness and uphold the 
ethical values of the informed consent doctrine.  This would be a costly 
and time-intensive endeavor for the DTC companies, but the rapid growth 
of the online personal genomics industry warrants this level of 
commitment.   
A key hurdle to overcome for the DTC genetic testing industry is that 
the current global genomics market outpaces the available genetic 
counselors and the capacity to educate and train new genetic counseling 
professionals.  As of 2018, it was estimated there were nearly 7,000 
genetic counselors worldwide in at least twenty-eight countries—with 
more than sixty percent of them practicing in North America.238  Europe 
clearly appears to lag behind the United States and Canada in the 
availability of genetic counselor training programs.  In fact, Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, and Portugal are among the EU member states who do 
not recognize the profession of genetic counseling “due to legal 
restrictions requiring that genetic counseling is [a] medical act, and 
therefore conducted by physicians.”239  As of 2018, only about eighteen 
countries in Europe had licensed genetic counselors working in various 
roles, and there were only eleven active genetic counselor master’s 
training programs throughout Europe, compared to nearly forty in the 
United States and five in Canada.240  Evidently, there are numerous 
difficulties involved with redirecting the limited number of genetic 
counselor resources into the rapidly expanding DTC genetic testing 
industry.241  Yet, market economics indicate that the supply of genetic 
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counselors eventually will rise to meet the demand, without compromising 
the essential work done by genetic counselors in clinical practice, research, 
education, and public health.242 
While some online DTC genetic testing companies provide consumers 
with access to genetic counselors, very few companies offer pre-test 
counseling services as part of the informed consent process.  For example, 
a 2010 study identified twenty online DTC companies (i.e., those that 
explicitly offered genetic testing for mental health conditions), fourteen of 
which did not provide any genetic counseling services.243  Five of the 
twenty companies did provide their own counseling services.244  Only one 
company, 23andMe, offered (at least at the time) independent counseling 
to discuss post-test results.245  Only three of the six companies that offered 
counseling services provided them for both pre-and post-test.246  The 
remaining three companies’ counseling services were post-test only.247  
The genetic counselors were available by various means—such as phone, 
Skype, or email.248 
Besides enhancing the informed consent process, pre-test genetic 
counseling could play a significant role in helping consumers decide to 
hand over their personal genomic data for research purposes.  Once 
consumers consent online to have their DNA processed and shared for 
research purposes, spit in the vial, and mail the saliva sample to the 
laboratory, the data will be shared until consent is withdrawn; and as 
23andMe explains on its website, once shared it cannot be “reversed or 
undone.”249   
23andMe CEO and co-founder Anne Wojcicki advocates for 
consumers to have the freedom to access their genetic data without 
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obtaining the approval of an insurance company or a physician.250  
However, outside of a traditional healthcare setting, it is arguably more 
imperative that consumers be given all the necessary objective facts (e.g., 
to include the test validity, clinical utility, risks, benefits, test 
consequences, data privacy issues, family concerns, etc.) in an 
understandable manner, and have the ability to share information and ask 
questions in the pre-test stage.  It is only after being presented with a 
proper informed consent process that a consumer should have the option to 
purchase a DTC genetic test or participate in genetic research.  To assist 
the informed consent process, DTC genetic testing companies could 
develop standardized decision tools “[t]o thoroughly think through 
[consumer/patient] preferences and risk information without relying only 
on a [counselor’s] memory, skills, and likings.”251  As Birkeland points 
out, these could be internet-based tools, brochures, or videos on various 
genetic tests and key issues of concern.252   
DTC genetic testing companies may offer access to pre-test counseling 
via several forms of communication, but face-to-face video conferences or 
web-link would probably result in the most effective informed consent 
dialogue.  In fact, a 2010 study of attitudes of European clinical geneticists 
underscores the importance of face-to-face counseling.253  Seventy percent 
of respondents strongly disagreed with offering a DTC genetic test without 
a face-to-face medical consultation when preventive or therapeutic 
measures could be taken based on the test results.254  The level of strong 
disagreement decreased considerably to thirty-nine percent when asked 
about DTC genetic tests of traits or conditions that have no or relatively 
minor health consequences (e.g., ear lobe shape or gluten insensitivity).255  
However, the level of strong disagreement spiked to ninety-four percent 
when asked about DTC genetic tests of conditions that are neither treatable 
nor preventable, and ninety-seven percent for conditions with serious 
health repercussions (e.g., neurological impairment).256  These findings 
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also demonstrate that different types of DTC genetic tests demand 
different levels of genetic counseling; not all DTC genetic tests necessarily 
require face-to-face consultations.257  Finally, the study revealed that most 
respondents raised the need for genetic counseling “before and/or after” 
DTC genetic testing to ensure consumers understand the results and their 
consequences.258 
23andMe’s CEO Wojcicki argues that consumers are empowered when 
they have access to their genetic test results.259  But, consumer 
empowerment is not just about the end result (i.e., access to one’s genetic 
test results).  Consumer empowerment is built upon a process, and that 
process starts way before any testing occurs.  As discussed earlier, 
individual autonomy and personal empowerment depend upon informed 
choices.  Beginning with the pre-market and advertising stage through to 
the post-test counseling and follow-up research opportunities, DTC 
genetic testing companies must rethink the content of information they 
provide to consumers, how the information is communicated, and the 
counseling services they offer to support consumers’ understanding of 
genetic testing.   
 
C. Recommendation 3—Build Corporate Responsibility in a Digital 
Age 
 
Finally, senior managers must be integrally involved at all levels of the 
informed consent process to successfully reform it and give it meaning.  
This begins with senior managers lending critical support to the 
development of new information strategies to address the weaknesses in 
the current online informed consent methods.  Senior managers also must 
insist upon the creation of effective and consumer-oriented genetic 
counseling programs. 
Additionally, there are some elements of the GDPR that serve as a 
model for online DTC genetic testing companies to develop a stronger 
informed consent framework.  As Claudia Quelle explained, “[t]he GDPR 
marries the emphasis on autonomy and consent with a parallel focus on 
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the duties of data controllers.”260  The regulation places the burden on the 
covered entity to appoint a Data Protection Officer (DPO) who reports to 
the entity’s highest level of management.261  The GDPR mandates where 
applicable that entities self-evaluate the risks, perform impact assessments, 
and identify and implement risk mitigation strategies. 262 DTC genetic 
testing companies could each appoint an officer to perform similar tasks to 
ensure they are fulfilling informed consent requirements in line with 
internationally recognized guidelines.  This position could be called the 
‘Informed Consent Officer’ (ICO).  The ICO, like a DPO, would act 
independently, but also be knowledgeable about the DTC genetic testing 
industry and an integral member of the corporation.  Although this would 
be a voluntary initiative, it could help to strengthen the credibility of the 
informed consent process and enhance consumer confidence in DTC 
genetic testing.  Consumers, health professionals, and government 
regulators would welcome bold moves by corporate management to self-
regulate.   
X. CONCLUSION 
The international Human Genome Project (HGP) began in 1990 and 
concluded in 2003, successfully sequencing the three billion DNA base 
pairs in the human genome and between 20,000 to 25,000 human genes.263  
All the sequence data derived from the HGP is stored in public databases, 
and scientists worldwide have free and unrestricted access to it.264  This 
remarkable achievement continues to have an immense impact on our 
society.  It has transformed our understanding of biological science, 
genomics, human health and disease, and has created new ethical, legal, 
and social challenges associated with these scientific advancements.  The 
HGP laid the foundation for the incredible growth of the DTC genetic 
testing market over the past seventeen years, and the resulting explosion of 
personal genomic data.  
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Now, the rapid expansion of the DTC genomic industry and big data 
brings society to a new crossroads where individual rights to data privacy 
and informed medical consent intersect with issues of consumer autonomy 
and access to DTC genetic testing services.  There is a delicate balance to 
achieve between empowering consumers and protecting them.   
DTC genetic testing companies hold the enormous power of data, and it 
is incumbent upon them to act responsibly and ethically in their collection, 
storage, and sharing of that data.  The GDPR has made strides in overall 
data protection.  However, EU consumers of online DTC genetic tests are 
still at risk of misunderstanding the consequences of their purchase and 
losing control over their genomic data due to the absence of adequate 
online informed consent.  This industry, like many others operating online 
internationally and cross-border, is difficult to regulate effectively.  
Moreover, EU-wide informed consent rules applicable to DTC genetic 
tests are unlikely to materialize in the near term and probably are beyond 
the scope of EU authority. 
As a result, there is flexibility for the industry to develop its own 
stringent bioethical and medical standards, including informed consent 
procedures.  Companies that commit to educating and counseling 
consumers in genomics and developing and implementing measures to 
ensure compliance with bioethical and medical values will be successful in 
retaining and growing their consumer base, not only within the EU, but 
globally.  If the industry fails to take advantage of the present opportunity 
to self-regulate, consumer interest and confidence in personalized health 
and genomics will likely wane and be written off as having been just 
another fad.   
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